The Mehta Law Group, Ltd.

The Mehta Law Group

2012-01-09T18:49:00.001-08:00

The Mehta Law Group, provides sound legal representation in the following areas:

* Divorce,

* Custody & Child Support

* DUI/ Traffic

* Contract/ Business Disputes

* Real Estate Closings

* Personal Injury

* Landlord

* Tenant Law

*Forecloure Defense

Flat fees and low hourly rates

The Mehta Law Group

312-590-2000

info@mehtalawgroup.com

Illinois Child Support May Change

2012-01-05T13:13:00.001-08:00

Illinois may alter child support formula'Income shares' method would consider both parents' incomes, time with childDecember 30, 2011|By Bill Ruthhart, Chicago Tribune reporterState officials for the first time in decades are pushing a major overhaul of a system that touches one of the most volatile of all family issues: how child support is calculated.The move aims at making the process fairer by considering both parents' incomes and time spent with the child, but some advocates already are arguing to change — or scrap — the new proposal, which won't be finalized until next spring.Ads by GoogleIL Grandparent VisitationLearn about Grandparent Visitation from the attorney who wrote the law www.goldberglawoffice.comAmicable DivorceFriendly and uncontested divorces. Contact us for a consultation. www.connifflaw.comHow to Stop Your Divorce.There are 7 Secrets. Get them Free. "I suggest you read this..." www.MarriageMax.com/Free-HelpPell Grants For MothersImprove Your Life. Moms May Qualify For Grants To Start School Online. schools.classesandcareers.comIf Illinois switches the calculation, it would join 38 other states that already have adopted versions of what's known as the "income shares" formula."Parents, both mothers and fathers, have talked a lot about making the establishment of child support a more transparent process," said Pam Lowery, director of the state's Division of Child Support Services. "That's exactly what the income shares model does. It's very fair."Currently, Illinois and nine other states use a "percentage of income" formula, which calculates child support by taking a flat percentage of the noncustodial parent's net income, based on the number of children he or she supports.It's time to modify the current formula, which dates to the 1980s and doesn't consider the realities of many modern families, say officials with the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services, its child support division and most family law experts it appoints to evaluate the state's system.The current model, Lowery said, includes outdated "buried assumptions," such as both parents having roughly the same income and not recognizing cases where a child splits time between parents.Incorporating those realities, the proposed income shares model doesn't assign flat percentages for support payments, but instead calls for children to receive the same amount as they would have had had the parents stayed together.The new formula would use an economic table listing the average costs to raise a child for intact families of various incomes. The formula considers each parent's income and assigns a percentage of total cost from the table based on how much each parent earns.The result, proponents argue, evenly weighs the financial footing of both parents and aims to curtail often-bitter disputes."The biggest reason for moving to an income shares model is that it will be perceived by both mothers and fathers as fair to all," said Margaret Stapleton, an attorney on the Illinois Child Support Advisory Committee, which has backed the change."People will see the baseline is what this child needs, what Parent A has and what Parent B has. I think people will see that as fairer."Critic cites cost of switchThe advisory committee, required by statute to review the state's system, voted 12-3 a year ago to study how best to switch formulas. With much of that work complete, it is waiting for an economist to complete the financial tables that would drive support payments under the new model.Reduce Your Child SupportStep By Step Instruction On How To Reduce Your Child Support Payment. www.LowerChildSupportPayment.comWith that work expected to be finished this spring, the committee hopes to move forward with its formal proposal to the General Assembly.If lawmakers adopt a change in 2012, it likely wouldn't take effect for two or three years — allowing time to update computer systems and for training, Lowery said.Although a change may be several years away, that hasn't tempered arguments over the proposed model.Joan Colen, a Chicago family law attorney on the advisory committee, voted against the new formula, calling the switch unwarranted.Experts consulted by the committee concluded support payments would not be altered dramatically under the formula, which will be "extremely expensive" to implement, Colen said."So, I keep asking, 'Why are we doing this?' I've yet to hear a satisfactory answer," she said. "The only one I've heard is that this will give the appearance of being fairer. In light of the significant cost, I don't find that to be adequate."Lowery said changing the calculation is estimated to cost between $2 million and $3 million, but she said that cost will be spread over multiple years and two-thirds of it will be covered by federal funding.There are more than 740,000 child support cases in Illinois, according to rough estimates based on state figures.For parents in the current system, it's unlikely their payments would be re-calculated under the new formula — unless a parent could show the model or other circumstances would lead to a significant adjustment in payments that would warrant review by a judge, Lowery said.An example, she said, would be if the custodial parent made a significantly larger salary than the noncustodial parent."For people already in the system, it won't make a lot of difference," Lowery said. "For people coming through it new, they will start off with a different perception, and I think that will help make stronger families."40 percent threshold

The Mehta Law group

2011-12-22T08:07:00.001-08:00

The Mehta Law Group, provides sound legal representation in the following areas: * Divorce, * Custody & Child Support * DUI/ Traffic * Contract/ Business Disputes * Real Estate Closings * Personal Injury * Landlord * Tenant Law *Forecloure Defense Flat fees and low hourly rates The Mehta Law Group 312-590-2000 info@mehtalawgroup.com

Gifts in a Divorce

2011-12-09T09:21:00.001-08:00

1. Are gifts subject to equitable distribution in a divorce case? No. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 specifically excludes from equitable distribution all gifts received by either spouse from a third party. The third party is in most instances the parties’ parents. However, it is important to note that interspousal gifts are subject to equitable distribution. The burden of proving that an asset is an interspousal gift rests upon the party alleging the status of the property. Many disputes have arisen over whether a gift was to one or to both spouses, or whether a gift to one spouse lost its separate and immune character by virtue of being commingled with marital property – for example, by deposit in a joint savings bank account. See Dotsko v. Dotsko, 224 N.J. Super. 668 (App. Div. 1990). A typical type of interspousal gift is the conveyance of a home owned by one spouse prior to the marriage to both spouses as tenants by the entireties after the marriage. Such a gift converts what would otherwise have been separate premarital property into marital property subject to equitable distribution. See Perkins v. Perkins, 159 N.J. Super. 243 (App. Div. 1978). It is important for a spouse to keep any of his/her assets that were derived from a gift(s) separate and distinct from the rest of the marital property. Separate property that is brought into the marriage is not eligible for distribution upon divorce. However, quite frequently the spouses commingle their resources. Consequently, separate property that was a gift is often commingled with marital funds. If this should occur, then an argument can be made that the gift was converted into marital property. Cases of this nature are decided on a case-by-case basis. If possible, it is always strongly advisable to keep gifts from your parents and your inheritance separate from your spouse’s finances.

The Mehta Law Group

2011-11-22T15:12:00.001-08:00

The Mehta Law Group, provides sound legal representation in the following areas: * Divorce, * Custody & Child Support * DUI/ Traffic * Contract/ Business Disputes * Real Estate Closings * Personal Injury * Landlord * Tenant Law *Forecloure Defense Flat fees and low hourly rates The Mehta Law Group 312-590-2000 info@mehtalawgroup.com

Gifts in a Divorce

2011-11-08T14:49:00.001-08:00

1. Are gifts subject to equitable distribution in a divorce case?No. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 specifically excludes from equitable distribution all gifts received by either spouse from a third party. The third party is in most instances the parties’ parents. However, it is important to note that interspousal gifts are subject to equitable distribution. The burden of proving that an asset is an interspousal gift rests upon the party alleging the status of the property. Many disputes have arisen over whether a gift was to one or to both spouses, or whether a gift to one spouse lost its separate and immune character by virtue of being commingled with marital property – for example, by deposit in a joint savings bank account. See Dotsko v. Dotsko, 224 N.J. Super. 668 (App. Div. 1990).A typical type of interspousal gift is the conveyance of a home owned by one spouse prior to the marriage to both spouses as tenants by the entireties after the marriage. Such a gift converts what would otherwise have been separate premarital property into marital property subject to equitable distribution. See Perkins v. Perkins, 159 N.J. Super. 243 (App. Div. 1978). It is important for a spouse to keep any of his/her assets that were derived from a gift(s) separate and distinct from the rest of the marital property. Separate property that is brought into the marriage is not eligible for distribution upon divorce. However, quite frequently the spouses commingle their resources. Consequently, separate property that was a gift is often commingled with marital funds. If this should occur, then an argument can be made that the gift was converted into marital property. Cases of this nature are decided on a case-by-case basis. If possible, it is always strongly advisable to keep gifts from your parents and your inheritance separate from your spouse’s finances.

The Mehta Law Group

2011-11-02T13:42:00.001-07:00

The Mehta Law Group, provides sound legal representation in the following areas: * Divorce, * Custody & Child Support * DUI/ Traffic * Contract/ Business Disputes * Real Estate Closings * Personal Injury * Landlord * Tenant Law *Forecloure Defense Flat fees and low hourly rates The Mehta Law Group 312-590-2000 info@mehtalawgroup.com

Medaition in Divorce

2011-10-24T05:04:00.000-07:00

MEDIATION OR COUNSELING REQUIREMENTS: If the court concludes that there is a prospect of reconciliation, the court, at the request of either party, or on its own motion, may order a conciliation conference. The conciliation conference and counseling shall take place at the established court conciliation service of that judicial district or at any similar service or facility where no court conciliation service has been established.In an action for dissolution of marriage involving minor children, or in a post-judgment proceeding involving minor children, the court may on its own motion order the parties, excluding the minor children, to attend an educational program concerning the effects of dissolution of marriage on the children, if the court finds that it would be in the best interests of the minor children. [Based on Illinois Compiled Statutes 750 - Chapter 5 - Section: 404 and 401.1]

Engagement Rings in a Divorce

2011-10-20T04:44:00.000-07:00

III. FAILED MARRIAGE The cases involving the distribution of a ring given in contemplation of marriage upon dissolution of a marriage have uniformly adopted the conditional gift theory. These cases apply contract principles. Such application almost always ends with the donee being awarded the ring. The cases often cite the three essential elements of an inter vivos gift: (1) a present intention on the part of the donor to make a gift to the donee; (2) the delivery of the property by the donor to the donee; and (3) the acceptance of the property by the donee. Upon acceptance, the donee's right to ownership becomes absolute in form. The courts further explain that there is a condition subsequent attached to the gift. In Lipton v. Lipton, 134 Misc. 2d 1076, 514 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159 (Sup. Ct. 1986), the court said: An engagement ring is a gift to which a condition subsequent, the fulfillment of the marriage agreement, is attached. . . . [A]lthough a gift made in contemplation of marriage is conditional, it is absolute in form when given. . . . The mere fact that a gift absolute in form may be defeated on the happening of a certain event does not invalidate the gift. . . . Thus, it was ab solute in form on the day it was given. Once the ring is given, it has become the separate property of the donee. Once the marriage is consummated, the donee has fulfilled the condition that entitles her to claim the ring as her separate property. She is entitled to the ring upon the dissolution of the marriage. The Mehta Law Group

The Mehta Law Group

2011-10-18T04:51:00.001-07:00

The Mehta Law Group, provides sound legal representation in the following areas: * Divorce, * Custody & Child Support * DUI/ Traffic * Contract/ Business Disputes * Real Estate Closings * Personal Injury * Landlord * Tenant Law *Forecloure Defense Flat fees and low hourly rates The Mehta Law Group 312-590-2000 info@mehtalawgroup.com

Chicago divorce attorney

2011-10-14T04:38:00.001-07:00

The Mehta Law Group, provides sound legal representation in the following areas: * Divorce, * Custody & Child Support * DUI/ Traffic * Contract/ Business Disputes * Real Estate Closings * Personal Injury * Landlord * Tenant Law *Forecloure Defense Flat fees and low hourly rates The Mehta Law Group 312-590-2000 info@mehtalawgroup.com

Jurisdiction and Venue in Divorce

2011-10-10T19:23:00.001-07:00

Jurisdiction and VenueDeciding where you may – and where you might – press your custody case is the first and one of the most important considerations you must undertake. Custody cases are usually brought in conjunction with a divorce case and, therefore, the location where a divorce case is started is sometimes – though not always – determined by the state and county of residence of the children. Custody cases, however, may be filed without a divorce.1 A “uniform” law2 (passed in virtually every state in one form or another) defines the general rule as this: the last state where the child lived for at least six months should be the state that should hold jurisdiction over a custody trial. Exceptions to the rule began to abound, however, and soon exceeded the rule itself. In response, the law was revised January 1, 2004 and the new law3 is very specific about where a custody case may be initiated.The new law quickly developed it’s own rules and exceptions and they can be very tricky – some periods of absence from the state count and some do not, and sometimes a period of residence don’t count – so be sure to work with an experienced attorney. Under the new, uniform law, the basic idea is to conduct the trial in the locale where the majority of witnesses and evidence can be found and to prevent one parent from gaining an advantage by grabbing the kids and running to a different state to file a case – in other words, to make the administration of the case flow as smoothly as is feasible and ensure justice. Still, talk with our attorneys to learn your options – it could make a world of difference in how your case plays out.The uniform law gives Illinois courts the authority to make custody determinations even if the court doesn’t have “personal jurisdiction” over one of the parents. Under the uniform law, custody determinations may be made “in rem” or “quasi in rem”4 — that is, even in cases where one parent is out-of-state and has never set foot in Illinois or even where his or her whereabouts are unknown. In some cases, notice may be given simply by running an ad in a newspaper. Illinois’ main child custody law, however, makes it clear that the other parent must be given adequate and proper notice.5The Mehta Law Group

The Mehta Law Group

2011-10-06T05:16:00.001-07:00

The Mehta Law Group, provides sound legal representation in the following areas: * Divorce, * Custody & Child Support * DUI/ Traffic * Contract/ Business Disputes * Real Estate Closings * Personal Injury * Landlord * Tenant Law *Forecloure Defense Flat fees and low hourly rates The Mehta Law Group 312-590-2000 info@mehtalawgroup.com

Full Service Law Firm

2011-09-30T04:13:00.001-07:00

The Mehta Law Group, provides sound legal representation in the following areas: * Divorce, * Custody & Child Support * DUI/ Traffic * Contract/ Business Disputes * Real Estate Closings * Personal Injury * Landlord * Tenant Law *Forecloure Defense Flat fees and low hourly rates The Mehta Law Group 312-590-2000 info@mehtalawgroup.com

The Mehta Law Group

2011-09-28T05:05:00.001-07:00

The Mehta Law Group, provides sound legal representation in the following areas: * Divorce, * Custody & Child Support * DUI/ Traffic * Contract/ Business Disputes * Real Estate Closings * Personal Injury * Landlord * Tenant Law *Forecloure Defense Flat fees and low hourly rates The Mehta Law Group 312-590-2000 info@mehtalawgroup.com

The Mehta Law Group

2011-09-20T04:51:00.001-07:00

How are property and debts divided at divorce?It is common for a divorcing couple to decide about dividing their property and debts themselves (with or without the help of a neutral third party like a mediator), rather than leaving it to the judge. However, if a couple cannot agree, they can submit their property dispute to the court, which will use state law rules to divide the property. Courts divide property under one of two basic schemes: community property or equitable distribution. Debts are divided according to the same principles. Community property. In Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and Puerto Rico, all property of a married person is classified as either community property (owned equally by both spouses) or the separate property of one spouse. At divorce, community property is generally divided equally between the spouses, while each spouse keeps his or her separate property.Equitable distribution. In all other states, assets and earnings accumulated during marriage are divided equitably (fairly), but not necessarily equally. In some of those states, the judge may order one party to use separate property to make the settlement fair to both spouses.Division of property does not necessarily mean a physical division. Rather, the court may award each spouse a percentage of the total value of the property. Each spouse will get personal property, assets, and debts whose worth adds up to his or her percentage. (It is illegal for either spouse to hide assets in order to shield them from property division.)

Gifts in a Divorce Case

2011-09-14T04:35:00.001-07:00

The Mehta Law Group

2011-09-08T08:30:00.001-07:00

Engagement Rings in Divorce

2011-09-08T08:28:00.000-07:00

WITH THIS RING: POSSESSION OF ENGAGEMENT AND WEDDING RINGS UPON TERMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP

I. INTRODUCTION

Engagement and wedding rings are one of the most popular traditions surrounding the institution of marriage. Traditionally, to formalize an engagement, a man gives his fiancee a ring as a token of his devotion. Upon marriage, both spouses exchange rings to show that they are binding themselves to one another as husband and wife.

Unfortunately, these promises to love one another forever do not always last as long as the rings which symbolize them. When an engagement or marriage fails, therefore, the ownership of the engagement and wedding rings often becomes an issue. Because the rings have a great deal of both sentimental and monetary value, that issue tends to be very intensely litigated.

The Mehta Law Group

2011-09-01T10:33:00.000-07:00

How to End Your Marriage – Divorce or Annulment?
By illinois on Thursday, September 1st, 2011 | No Comments
Are divorce and annulment the same thing? Well they both are the end of a marriage, but they each have their own ways of ending things. Divorce tends to be a bit more complicated than annulment, but could make more sense for some marriages. Are there restrictions in getting an annulment?

Annulment is a legal way to end the marriage, in a sense making it seem that it never happened in the first place. It effectively erases the marriage making it never valid. It can be initiated by either the husband or the wife and they must prove they have valid reasons for ending the marriage and the means of proving it.

Some reasons that must be proven to be able to annul a marriage are:

Bigamy: that one party is already married to someone else, without the other partner’s knowledge.

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Forced Consent: One partner was forced into the marriage under threat or duress and wouldn’t have married their partner otherwise.

Fraud: One partner misrepresented themselves making it appear they were someone they were not.

Marriage Prohibited by Law: Marriage that is illegal to enter into such as with a relative making it incestuous.

Some other reasons are: mental illness or instability, inability to consummate the marriage and underage marriage. Annulment is easier to obtain once proving any of these reasons and somewhat cheaper.

Divorce is more complicated and is the legal ending of a marriage – allowing both parties to remarry. Divorce is not wiped off the records and usually there is property and children involved.

Property division and child custody as well as settlement issues are all a part of the divorce process. Knowing each state’s law on divorce is important to having an easier one. For example some states are ‘fault’ states and others have ‘no-fault’, understanding the differences of these will be a good starting point.

A no-Fault divorce is where no one accepts the blame for the marriage dissolving, and a Fault divorce is where one of the spouses is considered to blame. Of course in this case, this must be proven

The Mehta Law Group

2011-08-31T06:31:00.001-07:00

The Mehta Law Group

2011-08-23T04:42:00.001-07:00

The Mehta Law Group

The Mehta Law Group, Ltd.The Mehta Law Group, provides sound legal representation in the following areas:* Divorce,* Custody & Child Support* DUI/ Traffic* Contract/ Business Disputes* Real Estate Closings* Personal Injury* Landlord* Tenant Law*Forecloure DefenseFlat fees and low hourly rates

The Mehta Law Group
312-590-2000
info@mehtalawgroup.com
www.mehtalawgroup.com

The Mehta Law Group

2011-08-16T06:23:00.000-07:00

The Mehta Law Group

2011-08-04T06:48:00.000-07:00

Who Owns Your Frozen Embryo?
Promises and Pitfalls of Emerging Reproductive Options
Robyn Shapiro is a lawyer in Milwaukee specializing in reproductive issues.

Our enhanced ability to freeze sperm, embryos and now ova, and then to thaw them without destroying their biological potential, has offered a number of new reproductive options to fertile and infertile individuals. In fact, cryo-preservation (freezing) of embryos is now a standard practice at in vitro fertilization (IVF) programs because it enhances both the safety and the efficiency of IVF.

Standard IVF treatment involves the surgical removal of eggs from a woman's ovaries, extracorporeal fertilization, and then placement in the uterus. The woman's ovaries are hormonally stimulated to produce multiple eggs so that more than the one egg naturally produced during a monthly cycle can be retrieved. Typically, many more eggs are retrieved than can be safely fertilized and implanted in the uterus at one time. Cryopreservation of embryos allows all of the retrieved eggs to be fertilized, a safe number to be placed in the uterus, and the rest preserved for transfer during later cycles.

In this way, embryo freezing ensures that at least several embryos are available for immediate transfer, and it relieves the woman of the physical burden and costs of again undergoing ovarian stimulation and egg retrieval during later attempts at IVF pregnancy. Usually, decisions about future use of cryopreserved embryos are not problematic. Yet, difficult ethical, legal, and social questions can arise if there is a dispute later about the disposition of the cryopreserved embryos.

Over the past several years, a number of well-publicized cases have highlighted dilemmas surrounding decisional authority over frozen embryos. In Davis v. Davis, 842

S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), Mary Sue Davis and Junior Lewis Davis attempted to have children through several in vitro fertilization attempts over a number of years. The last attempt resulted in seven extra embryos that were cryopreserved for possible implantation at a later time. The Davises had not executed a document specifying disposition of these embryos in the event of their deaths or divorce. When the couple filed for divorce, Junior Davis sought to enjoin the fertility clinic from releasing the embryos to Mary Sue for implantation, and thereby to assure that he would not become a biological parent, but Mary Sue sought "custody" of the embryos, initially so that she could have them transferred to her own uterus, and later so that she could donate them for another woman to gestate.

The trial court ruled that the seven frozen embryos were "human beings existing as embryos" and "children in vitro" whose best interests required "that they be available for implantation," and it awarded the embryos to Mary Sue. The court of appeals overturned the circuit court, finding that Junior Davis had a "constitutionally protected right not to beget a child where no pregnancy has taken place." The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the court of appeals decision, ruling that in resolving disputes about embryo disposition between gamete providers, if there is no prior agreement, the court must weigh the relative interests of the parties in using or not using the embryos on a case-by-case basis. Given the facts in Davis, the court found that Mary Sue's interests in embryo donation were not as significant as Junior's interests in avoiding parenthood.

In York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (S.D. Va. 1989), the court was asked to decide who had dispositional authority over a frozen embryo when the couple agreed on its use, but the IVF program challenged their decision. The Yorks had entered an IVF program in Virginia, and later moved to California. When they asked to have their cryopreserved embryo moved to a Los Angeles fertility clinic so that they could continue their efforts to become parents, the Virginia clinic refused, contending that the embryo had to be transferred to Mrs. York's uterus only at the Virginia clinic.

The agreement that the Yorks had signed stated that the Yorks had principal dispositional authority over the embryo, but it included only three dispositional options in the event that the Yorks no longer wished "to attempt to initiate a pregnancy": donation to an anonymous infertile couple; donation for research purposes; or thawing. The court found that this agreement created an enforceable bailment arrangement between the Yorks and the clinic, and that the clinic had an obligation to return the Yorks's property to them.

To minimize embryo disposition disputes, and to maximally protect privacy and liberty interests of the individuals involved, legislation should (a) affirm the gamete providers' decisional authority over their cryopreserved embryos; (b) require them to enter an agreement governing the future disposition of their embryos; and (c) ensure the enforceability of such prior directives. In the absence of a prior agreement, courts should prohibit use of frozen embryos by either party without the consent of the other.

Dispositional Authority

Individuals' fundamental constitutional privacy and liberty interests in controlling the exercise of their reproductive capacities suggest that gamete providers have the right to decide the fate of their frozen embryos. Whether embryos are considered to be persons (as they were conceptualized by the Davis trial court), mere body parts, or property (as the York court suggested), there are no compelling reasons to override the decisional authority of the gamete providers. If the embryo is considered to be a person, analogy to case law involving decision making for children makes it clear that the embryos' best interests will be promoted if the gamete providers maintain decisional authority.

Just as courts have acknowledged that parents are ordinarily the proper decision makers for their children because they are most concerned about their children's welfare, embryos' best interests are maximally protected if gamete providers maintain decisionmaking authority over their fate.

On the other hand, if an embryo is recognized as personal property, the gamete providers, as "owners," control their use. Moreover, if embryos are considered body parts, lodging decision-making authority in the gamete providers is also consistent with law establishing that individuals may donate their organs, semen, or blood to others, but they cannot be forced to give them up.

Prior Directives

Since the gamete providers are equal contributors to the embryo's creation, their dispositional authority over the embryo must be exercised jointly, and anticipation of the inability or unavailability of the couple to agree on disposition is crucial. To deal with the possibility of death, divorce, separation, disagreement, or closure of the fertility clinic, couples who undergo embryo freezing should be required to designate in advance their choices for disposition of frozen embryos in the event that such situations occur. Dispositional options may include: destruction of their embryos, donation for research, storage, or donation to another infertile couple.

Requiring the couple to make a binding choice regarding future disposition of their embryos, from among a sufficiently broad range of dispositional options, would prevent the opportunity for decision making by others (e.g., the state, the court, or the IVF clinic) in ways that might insufficiently value the reproductive concerns of the couple involved.

To date, only two states have enacted legislation addressing prior embryo disposition agreements. These state statutes, which take very different approaches, are of limited practical value. Florida's law provides that couples undergoing IVF must enter into a written agreement that provides for the disposition of embryos in the event of death, divorce, or other "unforeseen circumstances"; and in the absence of a written agreement, the gamete providers are given joint dispositional authority. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 742.17 (West 1997). The attempt in the first portion of this law to avert disposition disputes by requiring prior agreements is thwarted by the latter provision stating that in the absence of such an agreement, the disagreeing gamete providers have joint authority—an invitation for judicial involvement.

A 1986 Louisiana law declares that an in vitro fertilized ovum is a "juridical person" that can be disposed of only through implantation. If IVF patients "fail to express their identity" or renounce their parental rights, the physician is deemed to be the embryo's temporary guardian until adoptive implantation can occur. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:123, § 9:126 (West 1991). In Louisiana, then, an agreement may not direct embryo disposition other than implantation. Other options, such as donation for research, or destruction, are prohibited—although the constitutionality of this law is questionable in light of current abortion jurisprudence.

Legislation should establish the enforceability of prior embryo disposition agreements and ensure that dispositional options are not unduly restricted. In the absence of such legislation, courts should enforce these directives as other contracts would be enforced.

In September 1997, a New York appellate court did just that. In Kass v. Kass, 235 A.D.2d, 150, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1997), a couple had undergone 10 IVF attempts after entering into an agreement stating that if they no longer wished to have children together or were unable to make a decision about the embryos, the embryos could be used for research. The couple then divorced. The ex-wife requested sole custody of the embryos so that she could attempt to become pregnant with them. The trial court held that women should have unfettered discretion over cryopreserved embryos in such circumstances, but the appellate court enforced the couple's prior embryo disposition agreement.

Some object to enforcing prior embryo disposition agreements between the gamete providers due to the gap in time between execution and operation of the agreement. They contend that the possibilities addressed in the agreement are theoretical when the agreement is made, and that the gamete providers' needs and interests may change so drastically by the time for its implementation that enforcement of its terms would be unfair.

But such problems of foreseeability and/or changed circumstances do not differ in kind from those that attend many other contracts that are held to be binding even when changed circumstances make the original agreement undesirable to one or both of the parties. Clear rules upholding the enforceability of contracts provide the necessary incentives for the parties to bargain meaningfully and agree on precise terms.

In the Absence of a Prior Directive

In situations where gamete providers are unable to agree on the use of their cryo-preserved embryos, and no prior disposition agreement exists, the embryos should not be used by either gamete provider. Allowing one party to use the embryo to create a child over the objection of the other would not be consistent with the parties' intent in initially agreeing to participate in IVF, and it would contravene their status as equal contributors to the embryo's creation. At the time of cryopreservation, the parties consented to joining their genetic material in order to bear a child and thereby fill their joint reproductive goal.

In the absence of an advance disposition agreement, it is unreasonable to infer that they agreed to any other use of the embryo. Therefore, in light of the fact that the gamete providers are equal contributors to the creation of the embryo, with equal power over it, embryo use by either party, without consent of the other, to do anything other than creating and parenting a child together should be prohibited.

Furthermore, use of the embryo by one gamete provider to create a child, over the objection of the other, would unjustly infringe upon the nonconsenting provider's fundamental right to choose whether or not to become a parent. Analogously, an ex-wife clearly could not insist that she have access to the frozen sperm of her ex-husband, over his objections, in order to bear a child after they divorce. Even if the nonconsenting provider is absolved of financial and other parental responsibilities, many individuals in such circumstances would nonetheless suffer psychologically and emotionally due to their perceived moral duty toward their genetic offspring. In light of alternatives for parenthood available to the party wishing to reproduce, the objecting party's decision not to parent a child should be respected.

Conclusion

Reproductive technology in this country remains largely unregulated. Perhaps this is true because of the politically charged nature of the issue of assisted human reproduction, the speed with which our scientific and technologic capabilities have advanced, or the special sphere of privacy that has traditionally surrounded procreative choice. Legislation that would require and protect the enforceability of embryo disposition agreements, and ensure reasonable accommodation of dispositional alternatives, would help to prevent later disagreements without interfering with fundamental rights of reproductive autonomy.
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The Mehta Law Group

2011-08-01T06:56:00.001-07:00

The Mehta Law Group

2011-07-17T07:20:00.001-07:00

The Mehta Law Group

2011-07-14T04:44:00.000-07:00

Dads get involved with their kids during a divorce:

A lot of dads today are very involved in caring for their children. Some take their children to school, sports practice and doctors’ appointments. Many fathers take an active role in daily parenting. Women do not receive the custody of minor children just “because they are the mom”. Custody is determined based upon what is in the childrens’ best interest and the law is gender-neutral.

The Mehta Law Group
312-590-2000
info@mehtalawgroup.com
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The Mehta Law Group

2011-07-14T04:41:00.001-07:00

The Mehta Law Group

2011-07-11T04:53:00.001-07:00

The Mehta Law Group

2011-07-08T04:58:00.001-07:00

ALIMONY/MAINTENANCE/SPOUSAL SUPPORT:
The court may grant a temporary or permanent maintenance award for either spouse in amounts and for periods of time as the court deems just, without regard to marital misconduct, in gross or for fixed or indefinite periods of time, and the maintenance may be paid from the income or property of the other spouse after consideration of all relevant factors, including:

•The income and property of each party, including marital property apportioned and non-marital property assigned to the party seeking maintenance.
•The needs of each party.
•The present and future earning capacity of each party.
•Any impairment of the present and future earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance due to that party devoting time to domestic duties or having forgone or delayed education, training, employment, or career opportunities due to the marriage.
•The time necessary to enable the party seeking maintenance to acquire appropriate education, training, and employment, and whether that party is able to support himself or herself through appropriate employment or is the custodian of a child making it appropriate that the custodian not seek employment.
•The standard of living established during the marriage.
•The duration of the marriage.
•The age and the physical and emotional condition of both parties.
•The tax consequences of the property division upon the respective economic circumstances of the parties.
•Contributions and services by the party seeking maintenance to the education, training, career or career potential, or license of the other spouse.
•Any valid agreement of the parties.
•Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be just and equitable.

[Based on Illinois Compiled Statutes 750 - Chapter 5 - Section: 504]

The Mehta Law Group

2011-07-03T08:43:00.001-07:00

The Mehta Law Group

2011-06-29T03:46:00.000-07:00

How can I keep my divorce private from my employer?

There is no obligation to disclose a divorce proceeding to your employer. However, there may be requirements, from time to time, for you to physically appear in Court before the Judge.

Also, most parties divorcing with minor children will opt to facilitate child support payments through the State Disbursement Unit of Illinois via automatic withholding/garnishment from one spouse’s pay directly. The employer will receive a copy of the Uniform Order for Support establishing child support for the minor child(ren), as well as a Notice to Withhold directing the employer to withhold the specific sum for child support to be forwarded to the State Disbursement Unit.

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The Mehta Law Group

2011-06-27T17:53:00.001-07:00

LEGAL GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE:

No Fault: That the spouses have lived separate and apart for a continuous period in excess of 2 years and irreconcilable differences have caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage and the court determines that efforts at reconciliation have failed or that future attempts at reconciliation would be impracticable and not in the best interests of the family. If the spouses have lived separate and apart for a continuous period of not less than 6 months next preceding the entry of the judgment dissolving the marriage, as evidenced by testimony or affidavits of the spouses, the requirement of living separate and apart for a continuous period in excess of 2 years may be waived upon written stipulation of both spouses filed with the court.

Fault Grounds: The following grounds for dissolution exist if, without cause or provocation by the petitioner:

•The respondent was at the time of such marriage, and continues to be naturally impotent naturally impotent.
•The respondent had a wife or husband living at the time of the marriage.
•The respondent had committed adultery subsequent to the marriage.
•The respondent has willfully deserted or absented himself or herself from the petitioner for the space of one year, including any period during which litigation may have pended between the spouses for dissolution of marriage or legal separation.
•The respondent has been guilty of habitual drunkenness for the space of 2 years.
•The respondent has been guilty of gross and confirmed habits caused by the excessive use of addictive drugs for the space of 2 years, or has attempted the life of the other by poison or other means showing malice, or has been guilty of extreme and repeated physical or mental cruelty, or has been convicted of a felony or other infamous crime.
•The respondent has infected the other with a sexually transmitted disease.

[Based on Illinois Compiled Statutes 750 - Chapter 5 - Section: 401]

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The Mehta Law Group

2011-06-24T04:16:00.000-07:00

Who get's the pet in a divorce?

2011-06-21T07:27:00.000-07:00

Old dog Tray's ever faithful, grief cannot drive him away; he's gentle, he is kind; I'll never, never find a better friend than old dog Tray."

Stephen C. Foster, Old Dog Tray

The affection that people feel for their pets is real and palpable. That affection often leads parties to a divorce to argue by analogy to custody law that possession of the family pet should be decided on a "best interests of the pet" standard, separate and apart from the principles of classification and division of marital property. The courts have long recognized and commented upon the tension between custody and property law when it comes to pets.

One of the first decisions to comment upon considerations that a divorce court must undertake when considering the ownership of a dog was Akers v. Sellers, 114 Ind. App. 660, 54 N.E.2d 779 (1944), an action in replevin. The Appellate Court of Indiana, en banc, stated the august nature of the proceedings thus:

This is a controversy over the ownership and possession of a Boston bull terrier dog upon which the [husband], while declining to measure its true value to him in mere money, has placed an arbitrary value of $25. Were we to judge the importance of these proceedings by such a fictitious standard of value we would be inclined to resent this appeal as a trespass on the court's time and an imposition on our patience, of which quality we trust we are possessed in reasonable degree. But we have in mind Senator Vest's immortal eulogy on the noble instincts of a dog so we approach the question involved without any feeling of injured dignity but with a full realization that no man can be censured for the prosecution of his rights to the full limit of the law when such rights involve the comfort derived from the companionship of man's best friend.

54 N.E.2d at 779. After this introduction, we are told that the husband was given the dog during the marriage as a gift from a veterinarian. During the divorce proceedings, there was no formal disposition of the dog. The wife, being awarded the marital home, came into possession of the dog. The husband thereafter brought a suit in replevin for the return of the dog. The appellate court opined:

Whether the interests and desires of the dog, in [the divorce proceedings], should be the polar star pointing the way to a just and wise decision or whether the matter should be deter mined on the brutal and unfeeling basis of legal title, is a problem concerning which we express no opinion. We recognize, however, the tragedy of the dog's consignment to the wife if, in fact, his love, affection, and loyalty are for the husband.

Id. The court ultimately held that the trial court's decision, based upon a finding of fact that the husband had given the dog to the wife during the marriage, was supported by the record and not subject to attack on appeal.

The divorce courts, however, have not shied away from the Solomonic task of dividing a pet, thus leading to an evolving body of law concerning who gets Fluffy. This article will review case law concerning property division principles as they are applied to pets. This article will conclude that although a best interests of the pet standard is not appropriate when awarding the family pet, the court can and should consider who would care for a pet when making its ultimate division of marital property.

One of the first cases to consider the propriety of an award of the family pet to a party in a divorce action was Ballas v. Ballas, 178 Cal. App. 2d 570, 3 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1960). In that case, the wife was granted a divorce on the grounds of cruelty. Her single complaint on appeal was that the court erred in awarding a Pekingese dog and a Volkswagon to the husband.

The wife's evidence was that, although the dog was acquired during the marriage, it was purchased with her separate funds, titled in her name, and remained in her possession up until the judgment of the court. The husband had no evidence that the dog was community property other than his listing it as such. On this basis, the appellate court reversed the trial court, holding that "it is immaterial whether the dog was community property or the separate property of plaintiff." 3 Cal. Rptr. at 13. In other words, the court awarded the dog to the wife be cause she was the one who cared for it. Clearly, if the court was stating that property division principles were irrelevant, the court was employing a best interests of the dog test.

Perhaps picking up on the best interests of the dog test in Ballas, in Arrington v. Arrington, 613 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981), the trial court had appointed the wife as the managing conservator of the parties' dog, Bonnie Lou, granting the husband reasonable visitation rights with the dog. The husband appealed, arguing that he should have been named managing conservator of the dog.

The appeals court would have none of it, wisely refusing to apply a best interests of the dog test:

Bonnie Lou is a very fortunate little dog with two humans to shower upon her attention and genuine love frequently not received by human children from their divorced parents. All too often, children of broken homes are used by their parents to vent spite on each other or they use them as human ropes in a post divorce tug-of-war. In trying to hurt each other, they often wreak immeasurable damage on the innocent pawns they profess to love. Dogs involved in divorce cases are luckier than children in divorce cases they do not have to be treated as humans. The office of "managing conservator" was created for the benefit of human children, not canine.

Id. at 569. The court went on to state that dogs are property and must be treated as such. The court then concluded that the dog was the wife's property, but it hoped that both the husband and the wife would "continue to enjoy the companionship of Bonnie Lou for years to come within the guidelines set by the trial court." Id. In essence, the court affirmed the award of the dog to the wife, with visitation rights granted to the husband. Again, although the court applied property principles to determine the ownership of the dog, a best interests of the dog test was at play. How else to explain visitation rights?

More recent cases have made the test for division of a family pet clearer. A court must first classify the pet as marital or separate property, as it would any other item of property. The court may then consider, however, when making the ultimate decision of to whom to award the pet, who would best care for the pet.

In In re Marriage of Stewart, 356 N.W.2d 611 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984), the husband gave the wife a dog for Christmas during the marriage. When the parties separated, however, the dog remained with the husband, and the dog often accompanied the husband to work. The trial court held that "custody of the dog should be with [the husband]." Id. at 613 (emphasis added). The appellate court took issue with the characterization of the award of the dog as a "custody" order:

A dog is personal property and while courts should not put a family pet in a position of being abused or uncared for, we do not have to determine the best interests of a pet.

Id. The court then classified the pet as marital property and concluded: "We find no reason to disturb the trial court's decision on the award of the dog to [the husband]. We affirm the decision of the trial court." Id.; see also Gladu v. Gladu, No. 69, 1990.TN.524 (http://www.versuslaw.com) (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 1990) (issue of award of family dog should have gone to master with other items of personal property).

The most recent case to discuss the issue of equitable distribution of a pet was Bennett v. Bennett, 655 So. 2d 109 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). In that case, the trial court awarded "custody" of the parties' dog, Roddy, to the husband, with visitation rights granted to the wife. After judgment, the husband filed for rehearing, and the wife filed a motion for contempt and a change of custody because the husband was interfering with her visitation rights. The court granted the wife's motion, giving her visitation with the dog every other month.

The appellate court reversed, holding first that a dog is personal property, that this particular dog was the husband's premarital property, and that there simply is no authority for a court to award visitation with personal property. Of more concern to the court was the supervision problems that it envisioned were the parties to be granted visitation rights to property:

Our courts are overwhelmed with the supervision of custody, visitation, and support matters related to the protection of our children. We cannot undertake the same responsibility as to animals.

Id. at 110-11. The court thus disposed of the problem by finding that the dog was premarital property. The court may have been willing to go so far as to decide to whom to award the dog if the dog had been marital property. But it certainly was not willing to grant visitation rights. Cf. In re Marriage of Tevis-Bleich, 23 Kan. App. 2d 982, 939 P.2d 966 (1997) (enforcing separation agreement granting husband right to visit family pet); In re Marriage of Patchett, 156 Or. App. 69, 964 P.2d 1114 (1998) (reversing judgment holding wife in contempt for failing to turn over pet wallaby "Skippy" to husband pursuant to separation agreement, where actions of wife were not "willful" since wallaby was known to escape on occasion).

Some courts have managed to avoid the question of the best interests of the pet by employing a Solomonic division: one pet to one party, and another pet to the other party. This was found to be acceptable in Bolan v. Bolan, 32 Ark. App. 65, 796 S.W.2d 358 (1990). There, the court stated:

As her final point, [the wife] argues that the chancellor erred in awarding the family dog to [the husband]. The record discloses that the parties had two pets, a cat and a dog. [The wife] received the cat, and we cannot conclude that the chancellor's decision as to the dog was clearly erroneous.

796 S.W.2d at 362. But on what basis did the court award the cat to the wife and the dog to the husband? As a matter of classification, or as a matter of division? Or was the court engaging in a sexual stereotyping by affirming an award of a cat to the wife and a dog to the husband?

Finally, an interesting argument concerning the family dog was raised in S.L.J. v. R.J., 778 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). In that case, the husband claimed that the court erred in classifying the family pet as marital property, because the dog had been purchased as a gift for the parties' son. The court held that if it were true that the dog belonged to the parties' son, then the son would be the aggrieved party and the husband had no standing to raise the issue.

In conclusion, a family pet is an item of personal property, and principles concerning the classification of this property apply. Once it is determined, however, that the family pet is marital property or that the court has the authority to award the family pet to one party or the other, then the court may consider who would better care for the pet and who has the greater attachment to the pet. This is really no different from the many cases that award a particular piece of property to the party who asserts a greater sentimental value to an item of property. E.g., Starnes v. Starnes, 680 So. 2d 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (error to award to wife the hus band's childhood toys); Uluhogian v. Uluhogian, 86 Ill. App. 3d 654, 408 N.E.2d 108 (1980) (court should have awarded gold cross to husband, where husband's uncle gave cross to husband before marriage); In re Huffman, 493 N.W.2d 84 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (awarding wife her jewelry); Summer v. Summer, 206 A.D.2d 930, 615 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1994) (husband's photographs are marital property, but they should have been awarded to husband); In re Anderson, 94 Or. App. 774, 766 P.2d 1057 (1990) (trial court should have awarded wife piano and clawfoot piano stool that wife's grandmother gave to wife); see also Williams v. Williams, 613 A.2d 200 (Vt. 1992) (origin of property as family heir loom is relevant factor).

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The Mehta Law Group

2011-06-17T08:59:00.001-07:00

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2011-06-16T05:11:00.000-07:00

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2011-06-13T05:43:00.001-07:00

The Mehta Law Group

2011-06-06T12:26:00.000-07:00

Lottery Winning in a Divorce Case

2011-05-24T13:27:00.000-07:00

Lottery Winnings Ever since a majority of states acquired “lottery fever,” there have been a growing number of news stories and court opinions about how lottery winnings are to be divided in the event of a divorce. Sometimes the issue arises when one spouse wins a big lottery after the couple separates, but before a divorce becomes final. The spouse who bought the lottery ticket wants to keep all the winnings for himself or herself, while the other spouse wants a piece of the action.

The rule in most states is that if the winnings came from a lottery ticket purchased during the marriage—even if the parties were separated—the winnings are marital or community property, which means they can be divided between the husband and wife. In some states, however, the winner may keep all if the parties had already separated.

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www.mehtalawgroup.com

The Mehta Law Group

2011-05-23T05:33:00.001-07:00

Retirement Plan Issues in Divorce

2011-05-21T05:40:00.000-07:00

If your spouse has retirement savings, you are probably entitled, by law, to half. This money can be used for your own retirement or for a down payment on a house, relocation expenses, or other current expenses. To avoid the 10% penalty on early withdrawal, be sure to follow IRS regulations, as covered in Divorce and Retirement Assets: Getting the Money Without Getting the 10% IRS Tax Penalty.

The Mehta Law Group
www.mehtalawgroup.com
312-590-2000

Getting a Divorce?: How to Divide Military Pension

2011-05-18T05:03:00.000-07:00

The Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act (the Act) governs the terms and conditions regarding the division of your retired pay. Simply stated, they are too voluminous to completely explain in this article. This article will specifically address the four possible methods of defining the portion awarded to your soon-to-be former spouse. In a subsequent article we will explore the issues surrounding the survivor benefit plan (SBP) as well as other issues.

There are four potential options when considering a division of retired pay: a stated dollar amount, a percentage amount, a coverture fraction formula and a delayed order option. Each has its own advantage and/or disadvantage to you and/or your former spouse. Knowing how each method effects your financial situation could potentially put additional retired pay dollars into your pocket. I will comment on each below:

Coverture Fraction Formula

This Act states that the payment of an amount of retired pay must be expressed in dollars or as a percentage or fraction of disposable retired pay.

The most common way to divide a Military pension that has not yet matured would be through the use of a marriage coverture fraction formula. This formula simply divides the number of years of creditable service during marriage (numerator), into the total number of years of creditable service at the time the Member would retire (denominator).

On the surface this appears to be equitable and an argument can be made in either event. The major disadvantage to using this formula is that the DFAS will calculate the benefit based upon events that occurred after the date of divorce. Where the problem exists is that none of us have any idea as to what the future may bring. Anytime a formula is used to divide a pension at a later date; chances are the pension amount at a later date will be greater than the present day pension amount, due to increased earnings and accumulated years of service. Under the terms of your Military retired pay plan, you receive 2 or 2 ½ percent of your average 36-month high covered earnings, for each year of service. Do you think that your covered pay will continue to rise or fall in the future? Here's an example, lets assume that you have accrued a monthly benefit of $1,000 per month, you were married 15 years, you have 15 years of credible service, and your intent is to divide the benefit equally up to the date of divorce. Today, the equation states that 15 years of service over 15 years of marriage equates to 100%, meaning your former spouse is eligible for 100% of her 50% benefit or $500 per month. What happens if that Member continues to work, and retires with 30 years of service and his accrued benefit is now $3,000 per month. Under this scenario the equation is 15 years of marriage divided by 30 years of service or 50%. Thus, the former spouse is eligible for 50% of the 50% maximum benefit or 25% of $3,000. This equates to $750 per month as opposed to the $500 we calculated in the above scenario because the member continued to work after the divorce was final.

Your attorney can limit the potential increases with language stating that the Former Spouse's benefit is calculated based upon the covered earnings that were in effect on the date of divorce. In that regard, the Former Spouse will not benefit from your additional years of service or any gain in covered earnings with regard to your benefit calculation.

Many Members opt for this formula because they also use it to exclude service that was earned prior to the date of marriage. While your intent may be to exclude periods prior to marriage with the marriage coverture fraction formula, without the language we've recommended you may not end up with the outcome you expected.

If a marriage coverture formula is used, the Former Spouse's receives her benefit when it is paid to the Member. The Former Spouse's portion of the benefit is increased annually with a cost of living adjustment (COLA), just as the Member's benefit. Lastly, unless survivor benefit protection (SBP) is elected, the Former Spouse's benefit will cease upon death of the Member.

Dollar Amount

With respect to a member, using a dollar amount to express the awarded portion for a Former Spouse is unquestionably the most advantageous division . When expressing the award using a dollar figure, the Former Spouse is not afforded a COLA adjustment and the Member would receive that portion added to their portion of the retired pay. A Member's benefit can be easily calculated if you have a history of the Member's annual base pay while enrolled in the service. The Member simply accrues 2% (REDUX) or 2-1/2% per year for the first 20 years of the highest 36-month's base pay. Assume that Member's base pay is $3,219.60 per month and that's also his High 36. At 15 years of service the Member has accrued a monthly benefit of $965.88 per month payable after 20 years of service. Obviously, after 20 years of service the Member will generate a greater monthly benefit than $965.88. But in any event, using this scenario the Former Spouse is entitled to 50% or $482.94 at the date of divorce. Under this scenario, the Former Spouse will not be afforded a COLA and the Member will receive the COLA on the entire pension.

Percentage amount

Using a percentage is another option, but for an un-matured pension it is probably the least acceptable option for Members . This is because you don't know the exact date of retirement. For example, let's assume you used the marital coverture fraction to award a percentage, such as 15 years of marriage over 20 years of service (or 15/20 = 75.00% marital or 37.5% awarded to Former Spouse), and the Member decides to stay in the Military longer, the Former Spouse gets more than originally intended. In other words, it would be in the Member's best interest not to use a formula or a percentage that would divide any future interests. Expressing the award as a percentage allows for an automatic COLA adjustment to the Former Spouse's benefit in proportion to the Member's benefit.

Deferred Percentage

A deferred percentage is simply placing an order with the Military today, but leaving the calculation open and conclusion open. In that manner, when the Member applies for retired pay, all the parties would be notified and a “clarifying court order” would then be required. The reasoning behind this type of order is to notify the Military that a Former Spouse has been awarded a property settlement in regard to the Member's benefit. This method would be used if there impasse on any of the above methods. The only advantage to this method is that all the necessary information is readily available. This is without question the least attractive option for any Member. It delays the division to a later date and requires additional legal fees, time, and benefit delays. But, if there is impasse, this method works well. How this works is, at the date of commencement, all the calculations are complete and a new Military order is drafted using a percentage amount or a dollar amount based upon factual data.

The Mehta Law Group
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312-590-2000

Alimony in Lieu of Property

2011-05-17T05:13:00.000-07:00

Alimony in Lieu of Property
Under Illinois divorce law, the so-called “equitable distribution” principle (enacted in 1977) allows courts to allocate marital property in myriad ways. The asset mix in the “marital pot” in numerous cases, however, does not lend itself to a percentage division that a court is likely to order (or on which the parties might ideally agree). Lack of liquidity is a common reality; and, in some such cases, the would-be property transferor may prefer to draw on future income so as to effect a buyout of marital property claims. Commonly, this thinking leads to an arrangement in which, in lieu of property delivered to the other ex-spouse on entry of a judgment, a stream of future payments is structured as alimony for federal income tax purposes, buttressed with contractual terms providing for the stream to “ride through” most standard terminating events (such as remarriage, cohabitation, or death of the payor), as well as for the stream to be non-modifiable. Sometimes such a stream of payments is secured by an encumbrance on property. Various reasons exist for future alimony payments to be made in lieu of a turn-over of property at the time of entry of a divorce judgment; most frequently, illiquidity and overall tax planning are the primary motivating factors.

One key to such planning is that, ever since the 1984 reforms to federal divorce tax law, the “support requirement” for alimony treatment of a particular stream of payments has been eliminated (except in the context of temporary orders). Thus, in numerous circumstances, a stream of payments may be structured that reflect some indicia of property division installments, but, when carefully planned, will still constitute alimony for federal income tax purposes, thereby being taxable to the recipient and deductible by the payor. The usual objective, of course, is for the estimated present value after-tax worth of the projected stream of payments (from the recipient’s standpoint) to be substantially equal to the value of the property that theoretically would have been awarded by the judgment. In sum, creative combinations of available planning tools under Illinois divorce law and federal tax law often serve clients well, in large part because, such creative planning often proves to be the crucial element in achieving an amicable settlement.

The Mehta Law Group

The Mehta Law group

2011-05-16T04:26:00.002-07:00

Chicago — Attorney General Lisa Madigan today sued a Chicago area man for fraudulently marketing acai berry dieting schemes online, as part of a national crackdown with the Federal Trade Commission against affiliate marketers that con consumers into purchasing weight loss products through phony news websites

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www.mehtalawgroup.com
312-590-2000
info@mehtalawgroup.com

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2011-05-16T04:26:00.001-07:00

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2011-05-15T16:50:00.001-07:00

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The Mehta Law Group

2011-05-10T11:30:00.001-07:00

Oct 14, 2009 – The law firm of The Mehta Law Group, Ltd., announces the opening of its Chicago office. the boutique law firm opened its doors in October 2009, offering clients zealous representation in a responsive and effective way to help reach their goals, whether through alternative dispute resolution or trial. The law firm represents plaintiffs and defendants in claims and litigation, practicing in the areas of DUI Defense, Divorce, Real Estate Closings, Foreclosure Defense, Evictions, Landlord/Tenant Issues, and Business Litigation. The firm also provides in-house trial consulting services, offering clients strategic litigation support through mock trials, focus groups, witness preparation, and juror interviews.

The attorneys at The Mehta Law Group, Ltd. bring with them over 15 years of experience in trial work and mediation

312-590-2000 or mehtalawgroup@gmail.com

# # #

The Mehta Law Group, provides sound legal representation in the following areas:

* Divorce,
* Custody & Child Support
* DUI/ Traffic
* Contract/ Business Disputes
* Real Estate Closings
* Personal Injury
* Landlord
* Tenant Law
*Forecloure Defense

Flat fees and low hourly rates

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Chicago Lawyer

2011-05-10T11:28:00.001-07:00

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2011-05-02T07:27:00.000-07:00

Basic Divorce Questions

2011-05-02T07:26:00.000-07:00

I have to be separated from my spouse for 6 months or 2 years.
There are legal separation periods required for Illinois divorces. However, many people misunderstand them. If a divorce is based on reasons other than for irreconcilable differences (e.g., infidelity or cruelty), there usually are no required separation periods. The separation period applies to the time by which the divorce is ENDED not begun. Additionally, even if you are living in the same home together, you may be legally separated. Bottom line is that the separation period should not be the reason for delay.

I have to time the divorce perfectly

There is no such thing. We will help you with pre-filing considerations. It is important that you are prepared for the ups and downs of a divorce process. Preparation is what makes the timing right.

I have to pay for wrongdoing.

Illinois is a no fault state. That means that Illinois divorce laws do not reward or punish good or bad behavior in a marriage. There are some behaviors that have financial or custody linked consequences, but the justification for the consequences has nothing to do with fault.

I will win/lose my divorce case.

The truth is that divorce cannot be as easy as winning or losing. Divorce judges have great discretion. The difference in a divorce case’s outcome has more to do with realistic expectations and legal strategy than with notions of right and wrong or win and lose.

How to Avoid a DUI?

2011-04-20T06:55:00.000-07:00

What is a DUI?

2011-04-17T07:34:00.000-07:00

What is a DUI?

What is Sole Custody?

2011-04-17T07:33:00.001-07:00

What is Sole Custody?

The Mehta Law Group

2011-04-15T11:52:00.001-07:00

What is separation?

The Mehta Law Group

2011-04-15T10:03:00.000-07:00

The Mehta Law Group

2011-03-31T12:23:00.001-07:00

What is joint custody?

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2011-03-30T07:04:00.000-07:00

How do you check your case on line in Cook County?

Alimony What is it?

2011-03-29T05:15:00.001-07:00

Alimony answer?

Alimony or Maintenance is generally awarded to spouses who are a part of a long term marriage, who perhaps were unable to work for health reasons and who were married to spouses who could afford to meet their reasonable needs. Courts have maintained their efforts to provide reasonable subsidy to the lesser earning spouse.

Alimony or Maintenance awards are based upon the following:

1.Income and property of each party
2.Needs of each party
3.Present and future earnings of each party; including any impairment of this earning capacity due to the party devoting time to domestic duties, having forgone or delayed education,
training, employment or career opportunities; including time needed to cure such impairment
4.Standard of living established during the marriage
5.The duration of the marriage
6.Age, physical and emotional condition of both parties
7.Tax consequences of the property division of the parties
8.Contributions and sources by the party seeking maintenance to the education, training, career or career potential or license of the other spouse
9.Any valid agreement of the parties
10.Any other factors that the courts find just and equitable

Award Modifications
The Court uses six factors in determining if an award should be modified, reviewed or terminated. These six factors are as follows:

1.Changes in employment status of either party
2.Efforts made by the party receiving maintenance to become self-supporting
3.Any impairment of the present and future earning capacity of either party
4.Tax consequences
5.Duration of maintenance payments previously paid (and remaining to be paid) relative to the length of the marriage
6.Property, including retirement benefits, awarded to each party under judgment of dissolution of marriage, judgment of legal separation or judgment of declaration of invalidity of marriage

Alimony???

2011-03-29T05:14:00.000-07:00

What is Alimony?

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2011-03-06T04:28:00.000-08:00

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2011-03-06T04:25:00.000-08:00

The Mehta Law Group

Let our team of dedicated attorneys serve you in your ability to build a better future for yourself, your families, and your businesses. We represent families, children and professionals in every aspect of the legal process, from counseling to resolution. The attorneys at the Mehta Law Group bring with them over 15 years experience. Our courtroom skills and knowledge of evidentiary and procedural rules are outstanding. Whether you are contemplating filing a lawsuit to enforce your rights, or whether you have had a lawsuit filed against you, our office can provide excellent representation with the goal toward obtaining the best possible outcome.

The Mehta Law Group's Mission is to ensure that your case takes priority. It is our belief that every case deserves the utmost care, regardless of the issues presented. We have successfully served our clients in the past and will do so in the future by giving our clients virtually unlimited access to our attorneys.

We serve individuals and businesses throughout Cook, DuPage, Lake and Will Counties in matters involving:

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The Mehta Law Group

2011-03-04T15:45:00.001-08:00

The Mehta Law Group, Ltd.The Mehta Law Group, provides sound legal representation in the following areas:* Divorce,* Custody & Child Support* DUI/ Traffic* Contract/ Business Disputes* Real Estate Closings* Personal Injury* Landlord* Tenant Law*Forecloure DefenseFlat fees and low hourly rates

The Mehta Law Group
312-590-2000
info@mehtalawgroup.com
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2011-02-07T11:01:00.000-08:00

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2011-01-13T06:52:00.001-08:00

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2010-12-17T07:14:00.000-08:00

Friday, December 17, 2010
Cook County a "Judicial Hellhole"? Looking into the claims

The American Tort Reform Association has released its annual list of Judicial Hellholes and, once again, Cook County is prominently featured.

The catchy name and scary graphics almost guarantee press coverage and strong reaction. The report hasn't made a big splash in the Chicago papers as of yet, but then again, the report was just released this week. The Daily Herald noted the pending release of the "Judicial Hellholes" report this week with a story, by Ted Cox, quoting Thomas Demetrio (speaking "only partially tongue in cheek") as saying that ATRA's poor ranking of our local courts should be viewed as a "badge of honor."

Actually, Cook County's rating slipped a little in the current report. In its 2009 ratings, Cook County was the third worst jurisdiction in the country. This year, we were no better, or worse, than fifth.

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2010-12-07T10:51:00.001-08:00

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2010-11-24T05:03:00.001-08:00

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2010-11-13T03:36:00.000-08:00

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2010-11-08T07:35:00.001-08:00

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2010-10-23T03:51:00.000-07:00

THE MEHTA LAW GROUP

2010-10-19T05:05:00.001-07:00

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2010-10-13T05:00:00.001-07:00

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2010-10-05T08:01:00.001-07:00

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2010-09-27T05:29:00.001-07:00

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2010-09-20T08:56:00.001-07:00

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2010-09-15T19:35:00.001-07:00

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2010-09-02T11:12:00.001-07:00

INDO-AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION31st Annual DinnerSunday, September 12th, 2010 Holiday Inn Chicago North ShoreKey Note Speaker-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi
5300 W.Touhy AvenueSkokie, IL 60077
Cocktail Reception: 5:30 p.mDinner: 6: 30 p.mDonations $100Students $40please contact us at 312-590-2000 or info@mehtalawgroup.com if intested

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2010-09-02T11:11:00.001-07:00

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2010-08-30T18:30:00.000-07:00

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2010-08-26T10:43:00.001-07:00

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2010-08-12T05:05:00.000-07:00

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2010-08-10T04:37:00.001-07:00

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2010-08-06T04:03:00.001-07:00

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2010-08-02T13:16:00.001-07:00

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2010-07-28T08:36:00.000-07:00

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2010-07-23T04:34:00.000-07:00

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2010-07-19T06:47:00.001-07:00

Payday Reform Expected To Pass House

Photo by Mark MullisThe Illinois Legislature is closer to passing reform to the Payday Loan Act and the Consumer Installment Loan Act, which would close loopholes that have allowed some of the more predatory practices of lenders. Crain’s reports the Consumer Installment Act is expected to be amended to impose a cap of 99% on consumer installment loans under $4,000. The Payday Loan Reform Act will be amended to increase terms of loans to six months.

Lynda DeLaforgue, co-director of Citizen Action Illinois celebrated the legislation, which is expected to pass the House when lawmakers come back later this month saying “We will for the first time have set rates on these unsecured loans made to the most vulnerable borrowers.” Payday loan businesses have come under fire for charging incredibly high interest rates and preying on lower income people. Predictably, one of Illinois’ biggest lenders, PLS Financial Services was displeased and are reportedly considering moving their headquarters out of state.

While the Payday loan industry might bemoan the measure, the bill itself is a more moderate compromise. According to Progress Illinois, a 99% is still high by conventional standards. In addition, limits set by the 2005 Payday Loan Act, such as charging no more than $15.50 per $100 loaned in a two week period remain the same.

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2010-07-16T11:50:00.001-07:00

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2010-07-09T07:47:00.001-07:00

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2010-07-06T07:43:00.000-07:00

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2010-06-28T07:28:00.001-07:00

Mortgage foreclosure mediation program launched

Circuit Court of Cook County Chief Judge Timothy C. Evans has announced a program to assist struggling homeowners facing foreclosure.

According to the Circuit Court's press release (linked above), the Cook County Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation Program "will provide free housing counseling and legal services to Cook County homeowners and families in foreclosure. The program is aimed at helping homeowners resolve their mortgage cases in the most timely and respectful manner possible."

Judge Evans said, "The program's goal is to deliver critical services to homeowners as early as possible once the foreclosure process begins. In this way, homeowners in crisis are assured of receiving the support and information they need to explore fully their options either to stay in their homes or to negotiate a respectable exit."

To be eligible for this program, a person must be the owner and occupant of a 1-4 family home or condominium. Investment properties are not part of this program. The property being foreclosed must be in Cook County and must be the borrower-defendant's primary residence. Finally, the program applies to all foreclosure cases with an initial case management date on or after June 11, 2010. All such cases will have been filed on or after April 12.

Although I do not handle mortgage foreclosure cases, I took the opportunity to attend an April 9 briefing by Judge Dorothy Kirie Kinnaird, the Presiding Judge of the Chancery Division, offered for practitioners. In her remarks, Judge Kinnaird stressed that the program is not meant to delay foreclosure when foreclosure is appropriate; mediation will be allowed only when there is "something to negotiate." In some cases, there may be nothing at all to mediate, although there still may be an opportunity to work out a dignified way to leave the property.

Who decides whether there is something to negotiate in any given case?

The first step in determining whether a homeowner will be able to stay in his or her home is to contact a HUD-certified housing counselor. Any homeowner sued for mortgage foreclosure summons after April 12 should be served with a new five page summons. The second page of the new summons form provides the information that a homeowner needs to pay attention to in order to participate. Among the items on that notice is a toll-free number to call to set up a meeting with a HUD-certified housing counselor that is participating in the Cook County program. Information about securing legal representation is also included on that form. Interested readers can find out more about these services by visiting cookcountyforeclosurehelp.org.

Homeowners facing foreclosure may be contacted by all sorts of people offering to help. Unfortunately, some of these people may only be out to help themselves. Sadly, there are people who would prey on distressed homeowners. Homeowners must be careful to deal only with knowledgeable attorneys and reputable, HUD-certified housing counselors.

According to Judge Evans, the Cook County Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation Program is an unprecedented partnership between the Circuit Court of Cook County and several state and local organizations. According to the court's press release, the program is funded by the Cook County Board and administered by the Circuit Court's Chancery Division, the Circuit Court "and partner organizations, including the Illinois Housing Development Authority, The Chicago Bar Foundation and The Chicago Community Trust." The program will work with "attorneys and mediators from the Center for Conflict Resolution, the Chicago Legal Clinic and Chicago Volunteer Legal Services to provide access to free assistance to homeowners who have received a summons to appear in court."

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2010-06-25T04:02:00.001-07:00

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2010-06-21T04:55:00.000-07:00

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2010-06-14T08:59:00.001-07:00

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2010-06-09T04:37:00.000-07:00

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2010-06-04T12:06:00.001-07:00

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2010-06-01T04:30:00.001-07:00

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2010-05-26T04:17:00.001-07:00

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2010-05-19T04:42:00.001-07:00

Elected judges not "more biased or incompetent than their appointed counterparts"

That's the position taken by Eric Posner, the Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, in the May 17 issue of Newsweek.

Professor Posner writes that ongoing research, in which he and colleagues from Duke and New York Universities are engaged, supports this conclusion. Elected state court judges, says Posner, are more productive than their appointed brothers and sisters (as measured by the numbers of opinions produced), "nearly as professionally respected (as measured by citations per opinion), and no less independent (as measured by their willingness to disagree with judges in their own party)."

Posner's bottom line: "[A]s long as judges, like politicians, have the power to shape law through their decisions and interpretations, they must be accountable to their communities."